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Introduction
It is commonly accepted among agricultural economists that supporting farm income is the
central purpose of most government interventions in agricultural markets (Gardner, 1992). For
Austria this objective is stated directly and indirectly several times in paragraph 1 of the
"Landwirtschaftsgesetz" (Agricultural Status). The study intends to make a contribution by
evaluating the efficiency of government intervention using a more complex model than previous
studies. In particular, a three-stage vertically-structured model including imperfectly competitive
agricultural input markets, the bread grains market, and the imperfectly competitive food industry is
set up. This simulation model is applied to investigate if the utilized bread grains policy was least
cost efficient. In particular, the actual policy is compared to the most efficient combination of
currently employed policy instruments given that government intends to support farm income at
lowest possible cost to society. Since the results crucially depend on the model parameters a range of
possible parameters values utilizing information from a comprehensive literature review is assumed
instead of point estimates. Parameter values within this range are randomly chosen and the above
described simulations are conducted. By repeating this procedure 1000 times one can derive a
distribution of potential welfare outcomes rather than a point estimate. The bread grains sector in
Austria before the accession to the EC serves as the empirical basis for this study.
2. Modelling the Austrian Bread Grains Sector Including Agribusiness
The Model
The Austrian bread grains sector including agribusiness (agricultural input suppliers as well as
food industry) is modeled by a log-linear, three-stage vertically-structured model. The first stage
includes markets of agricultural input factors used for bread grains production. Since 95 % of
farmland is owned by farmers and 86 % of labor in the agricultural sector is self-employed, these two
resources are assumed to be offered solely by farmers. On the contrary, durable goods (mainly2
machinery and buildings), and operating inputs (mainly fertilizer, pesticides, and seed) are produced
by industries. It is assumed that domestic consumption of input factors equals domestic production.
This is certainly correct for land and agricultural labor but might not be exactly accurate for
industrially produced input factors. However, in both cases the major share of domestic consumption
was produced domestically.
At the second stage, input factors of the first stage are used to produce bread grains assuming a
Cobb-Douglas technology. The first and the second stage are linked by the assumption that
agricultural firms maximize their profits.
At the third stage the produced quantities of bread grains are used for food production, animal
feed, and exports. Firms which process food combine bread grains with other input factors of durable
goods and industrial labor assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology. Again, the second and the third
stage are linked by the assumption that food industry firms maximize their profits. Import and export
of processed bread grains do not play an important role. Hence, it is assumed that domestic demand
of processed bread grains equals domestic supply. Bread grains which are neither used for food
production nor for animal feed are exported.
Firms in the farm sector are assumed to have no market power. This assumption is justified by
the large number of firms producing bread grains and by the fact that farmers take prices given by
government. Input industries and the food industry as defined in the model are conglomerates of
separate industries. Durable goods include agricultural machinery as well as agricultural buildings.
Operating inputs include fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, fuel, lubricants, etc. Wholesale buyers, mills, as
well as the bread, noodle and baker's ware industries comprise the food sector. For this reason, the
market structure of these aggregations of industries is hard to define and therefore modeled by a
variable oligopoly. Since the model is log-linear, oligopoly-pricing behavior can be described by a
mark-up over marginal cost. The mark-up coefficient y is defined by a conjectural variation model,3
y = 1+(1+l)/(Mh), where l is the conjectural variation term describing expectations about
competitors' behavior, M is the number of identical firms in the industry, and h is the elasticity of
demand (Maier, 1993). Different l's correspond to different oligopoly theories. Assuming l = 0
corresponds to the Cournot conjecture, l = -1 corresponds to the Bertrand conjecture, and if l = M-1,
the outcome is collusion. The mark-up coefficient y is a number between zero and one. If for
example y = 0.5, the price for a unit of food is twice as high as the marginal cost of producing this
unit.
Model Parameters
Given the assumed Cobb-Douglas technology production elasticities equal input cost shares.
Cost shares of bread grains production in Austria are investigated utilizing the official gross margin
calculations of the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry as well as gross margin and value added
calculations based on SPEL (production and income model for the agricultural sector of the
European Community) data (Kniepert). The observed cost shares do not differ significantly from the
one reported in the literature for other Western European countries (e.g. Heshmati and Kumbharkar)
and the assumed ranges are reported in Table 1. The same procedure is used in the case of food
production utilizing Austrian industry statistics.
Supply of inputs used at the farm as well as at the food industry level certainly get more elastic
in the long run. However, given the observation that governments are more or less frequently
changing intervention levels or policy instruments we are more interested in the short and medium
run effects of the policy.
Supply of land for bread grains production is assumed to be perfectly inelastic for two reasons.
First, production of bread grains in an appropriate quality is only possible in certain climatically
favorable areas. Second, though it is certain that the amount of land under bread grains is sensitive to4
the level of returns in the long run, here in this short to medium run analysis a long time lag for
adjustment is assumed.
All other elasticities are derived from an extensive literature review. A few studies have
estimated farm labor supply elasticities at the household level. Lopez reports an on-farm labor supply
elasticity of 0.12 at the sample mean for Canada. Thijssen estimates an elasticity of 0.17 for Dutch
farmers. However, the aggregate sectoral supply elasticity is usually assumed to be higher since one
has to take into account that labor force might move in or out of the sector. Most of the studies on
aggregate farm labor supply in developed countries date back to the sixties and seventies using
simple estimation procedures.
1 Estimated elasticities are in a wide range between 0.03 and 2.84 with
a tendency of being larger in the long run and for hired labor. Given the high percentage of family
labor in Austria and the medium run orientation of our analysis the supply elasticity of farm labor is
assumed to lie in the wide range of 0.1 to 1.5.
Labor supply elasticities for non-farm sectors or whole economies are also found to be quite
inelastic based on household data. For example Hansson and Stuart (1985) surveyed about 40 studies
and calculated a median uncompensated supply elasticity of 0.1 and a compensated supply elasticity
of 0.25. In an comparable effort Fullerton derived a supply elasticity of 0.15. Again, aggregated labor
supply studies estimate much higher elasticities. For example Kimmel and Knieser find that a 1 %
change in wage rates will reduce the hours worked by each employee by 0.5 %, but will also reduce
the number of employees by 1.5 %. While the first number is comparable to the elasticity estimated
in most cross section analyses as reviewed by Hansson and Stuart or Fullerton, the second number
refers to the aggregated effect of a wage change. Using aggregated data of 22 OECD countries
Hansson and Stuart (1993) derive aggregated uncompensated labor supply elasticities between 0.2
and 1.4, and compensated supply elasticities between 0.96 and 2. For Austria they report an
                                                       
1 Eleven different studies were reviewed.5
uncompensated elasticity of 0.76 and an compensated elasticity of 1.5. Therefore, it is assumed that
the food industry labor supply elasticity is somewhere in the wide range of 0.1 to 1.5.
Estimations of supply elasticities for durable goods and operating inputs are more or less absent
from the literature. To our knowledge the only exception is an estimate of the supply elasticity of
farm machinery for milk production in the UK by Dryburgh and Doyle of 1.88. While some studies
from a theoretical point of view assume that supply of these goods is perfectly elastic (at least in the
long run), others assume values typically in a range between 1 and 3 (e.g. Gardner, 1987; Maier,
1993). We follow the latter and assume a range between 1 and 3.
In accordance with a recent elaborated study for Austria (Wüger), as well as multiple studies for
other European countries, the demand elasticity of bread grains products is assumed to be in the
range of – 0.1 to – 0.6 (Table 1). Neunteufel and Ortner estimate own-price elasticities for feed
wheat and feed rye of – 0.932 and – 1.427, respectively. Since the ratio of feed wheat to feed bread
grains is 78 %, the elasticity of bread grains for feeding purposes is assumed to be –
0.932*0.78 + 1.427*0.32 = 1.041. This value is about in the middle of reviewed values which range
from – 0.3 to – 2.
According to Sexton and Lavoie most empirical studies on market power in food processing find
relatively small departures from competition. There has been little detailed study of industries that
supply manufactured inputs to agriculture. According to McCorriston the actual observed behavior
of input industries (fertilizer, tractor) in the UK was significantly more competitive than the Cournot
outcome. Given this we assume a moderate mark-up behavior of food industry as well as input
industries with 0.7 £ y £ 1.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters derived from estimations and taken from the literature.
Using these elasticities the model is calibrated, in order to match the three year averages of the prices
and quantities over the period 1991 - 1993.6
Bread Grains Policy
Government intervention in Austria's bread grains market is illustrated in Figure 1; Dfo is the
domestic demand for bread grains for food production, D is the total domestic demand for bread
grains including demand for feeding purposes, S is the domestic supply, St is the domestic supply
given the fertilizer tax, and Dw/Sw is the foreign demand/supply line, both perfectly elastic at the
prevailing world-market price because of the small-country assumption. Since 1988 farmers obtain a
high floor price (PQD) only for a specific quota QQ rather than the whole production. However, since
farmers have to pay a co-responsibility levy (CLPQD) the net producer price is PQD – CLPQD.
Quantities, which exceed the quota, can be delivered at a reduced net floor price PE – CLPE. Food
processors have to buy bread grains at the high price PQD, while the price of bread grains for feeding
purposes is PE. Therefore, domestic demand for bread grains for food production is QD, domestic
demand for feeding purposes is QE and exports are QX = QS – QD – QE.
3. Empirical Results
To test how efficient the Austrian bread grains policy was in supporting farm income a method
developed by Bullock and Salhofer is utilized. In particular it is assumed that government tries to
maximize welfare of nonfarmers (UNF) given a socially demanded level of farmers welfare.
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Assuming that this socially demanded welfare level of farmers (UF) is reflected in the actually
observed level (UF
A), and that the policy instruments available to government are the actually used
instruments, government’s decision problem can be formalized as:
(1)   
) (
max
Q PE PQD E QD ,Q ,CL ,CL ,P P
NF U     s.t. UF = UF
A .
                                                       
2 Note that equally one could describe government’s optimization problem as maximizing social
welfare (or minimizing social cost), given a certain amount of farmer’s welfare.7
Beside supporting farm income, "securing a sufficient supply and quality of bread grains
products and animal feedstuffs" was an important explicit goal of Austria's bread grains policy. In
accordance with this objective a self-sufficiency constraint is introduced which requires that total
domestic demand never be greater than domestic supply. Since the official goal of introducing a tax
on fertilizer was soil protection rather than income redistribution, this policy instrument is kept at the
current intervention level. Hence, government can freely choose the levels of five policy instruments
(PE, CLPE, PQD, CLPQD, QQ) to redistribute income at the lowest possible social cost.
Comparing the welfare level of nonfarmers derived in this optimization problem (UNF
*) to their
actual welfare level (UNF
A) measures the social cost of suboptimal combination of policy instruments
(SCSC) or reveals the potential welfare gains to nonfamers from using the same instruments at
alternative levels:
(2)   SCSC = UNF
* - UNF
A.
The higher these social cost are the less efficient the actual policy turns out to be.
Optimization problem (1) is solved numerically for 1000 different random draws of parameters
values within the ranges discussed above using the model described in the previous section, standard
welfare measures and GAMS software (Brooke et al.). By doing so, we are able to derive a
distribution of possible SCSC rather than a point estimate.
3 As depicted in Figure 2 at the mean the
government could have improved social welfare by ATS 2,002 million. As implied by a skewness of
0.02 and a kurtosis of 3.09 the distribution of these potential welfare improvements is close to a
normal. Hence, given a standard deviation of ATS 196 million in about 950 of the 1000 simulations
the potential welfare improvements lie between ATS 1,666 and ATS 2,341 million. These numbers
                                                       
3 Similar methods to derive a distribution of welfare measures rather than point estimates are
discussed in more detail in Zhao et al. .8
are quite high if one considers that the welfare of bread grains farmers is estimated to be between
ATS 817 million and ATS 2,043 million, with a mean of ATS 1,358 million.
To get some idea how parameters influences the results the parameter values of the 1000
simulations are regressed against the SCSC. Taking logarithms allows an interpretation in percentage
changes. It turns out that the most important parameter is the factor share of the agricultural product
in producing food. A ten percentage increase in factor share, e.g. from 0.32 to 0.352 would increase
the potential welfare improvements at the average by ATS 165 million what is a little bit less than
one standard deviation. Other important factors are the mark-up coefficients. For example a ten
percentage decrease of the mark-up coefficient for food industry, e.g. from 1 to 0.9 would decrease
the SCSC by ATS 93 million.
4  Summary and Conclusions
As a rule, governments defend their policy as efficient in common political statements. Utilizing
a three-stage vertically structured model including upstream and downstream industries it was shown
over a wide range of possible model parameter values that the Austrian bread grains policy was quite
inefficient in supporting farm income. In fact, the potential welfare gains from using the same policy
instruments, but at efficient levels, are estimated to be significant larger than the estimated welfare of
the supported group. Observing that government was very inefficient in achieving the explicitly
stated objectives of agricultural policy stimulates the discussion about implicit policy objectives.9
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
Production Elasticity of Farm Labour 0.32 - 0.37 Supply Elasticity of Agricultural Labour 0.1 - 1.5
Production Elasticity of Land 0.05 - 0.10 Supply Elasticity of Land 0
Production Elast. of Durable Goods in Agriculture 0.12 - 0.17 Supply Elasticity of Durable Goods in Agriculture 1 - 3
Production Elasticity of Operating Inputs 0.41 - 0.46 Supply Elasticity of Operating Inputs 1 - 3
Production Elast. of Food Industry Durable Goods 0.40 - 0.45 Supply Elasticity of Food Industry Durable Goods 1 - 3
Production Elasticity of Food Industry Labour 0.30 - 0.35 Supply Elasticity of Food Industry Labour 0.1 - 1.5
Production Elasticity of Bread Grains 0.20 - 0.30 Mark-up Coefficient of Operating Inputs Industry 0.7 - 1
Demand Elasticity of Food –0.1 - –0.6 Mark-up Coefficient of Durable Goods Industry 0.7 - 1
Demand Elasticity of Feed –0.6 - –1.5 Mark-up Coefficient of Food Industry 0.7 - 111
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
Dependent Variable: logarithm of SCSC
Independent Variables In Logarithms Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant 9.119144 0.060138 151.6362 0.0000
Factor share land -0.003395 0.002768 -1.226561 0.2203
Factor share agr. Durable goods. 0.085335 0.005497 15.52335 0.0000
Factor share labor 0.049709 0.013217 3.761098 0.0002
Factor share operating inputs 0.209993 0.016380 12.81973 0.0000
Factor share food industr. labor -0.025154 0.028506 -0.882424 0.3778
Factor share bread grains 0.823972 0.012810 64.32244 0.0000
Supply elast. agr. durable goods -0.042709 0.001769 -24.13611 0.0000
Supply elast. agr. labor 0.017378 0.000801 21.70742 0.0000
Supply elast. operating inputs -0.124841 0.001810 -68.96104 0.0000
Sup. elast. food industr. durable goods -0.002105 0.001791 -1.175333 0.2401
Supply elast. food industr. Labor -0.001488 0.000819 -1.817657 0.0694
Demand elast. of feed
a 0.001637 0.002061 0.794332 0.4272
Demand elast. of food
a 0.061019 0.001123 54.31747 0.0000
Mark-up coeff. food industr. 0.462210 0.005233 88.32007 0.0000
Mark-up coeff. durable goods industr. 0.028349 0.002867 9.886364 0.0000
Mark-up coeff. operating inputs
industr.
0.211476 0.005325 39.71573 0.0000
R-squared 0.959805    Mean dependent var 7.598963
Adjusted R-squared 0.959151    S.D. dependent var 0.084974
S.E. of regression 0.017174    Akaike info criterion -5.273962
Sum squared resid 0.289939    Schwarz criterion -5.190530
Log likelihood 2653.981    F-statistic 1467.058
Durbin-Watson stat 2.077752    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
a) Demand elasticities are in logarithms of absolute values.12
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